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MCELROY LECTURE
Law, Ethics and Mystery*
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.**
A. Diverse Normative Realms
For almost as long as mankind has been self-conscious about how a
person should act, it has been recognized that we respond to several
different guides to conduct. Children in their youngest years begin with
simple ideas such as “I want”— “I want milk,” for example. Also, “I don’t
want”— “I don’t want to go to bed,” or “I don’t want spinach.” Not long
after, a child learns that there are family rules, such as “It is time to go to
bed.”1 As life moves along, we discover that there are rules at school, at
the playground, in our circle of friends, and in the workplace. In political
society we learn that there is law, a formidable body of norms having
something to do with the police, the courts, and formal regulations.
These guides to conduct operate in different domains, in that the rules
of the playground do not correspond to the rules at home or those operating
inside the schoolhouse, and so on. These different venues can be called
normative realms, to fashion a common name for them. The term
“normative realm” is perhaps pretentious, but it is analytically definite.
As for “normative,” a guide to conduct is normative in the tautological
sense that it affirmatively prescribes or fore-ordains a course of action, or
negatively proscribes, or prohibits some other course of action: “wash the
dishes” and “stay in line” are affirmative obligations; “don’t pick on the
little kids” and “don’t be late for the meeting” are negative ones. Each of
these obligations originates from a source, and many obligations originate
from a common source. The common source of a set of obligations can be
called a realm. The term “realm” derives from the idea of kingship, an oldfashioned form of political governance. “Realm” refers both to the
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authority from which the guidance has been issued and the arena in which
the guidance is recognized as authoritative.
In a politically organized society there is a realm called law, referring
to norms operative throughout the society and promoted by a commonly
recognized authority. In a modern society, a legal system includes a
complex body of formal regulations and a complex set of institutions that
formulate, interpret, and apply those regulations. A modern legal system
includes simple regulations such as highway speed limits and very
complicated regulations such as the tax code and rules of court procedure.
The legal system of course includes legislatures and courts, police and
regulatory agencies, and lawyers and legal compliance officers. But the
legal system also includes the ordinary citizens to whom most of the
regulations are addressed. We lawyers often overlook the fact that ordinary
citizens are not only being addressed by the law, but also interpret and react
to the law and thereby help define and reshape its meaning. Their
acquiescence provides recognition of the legal systems and thus contributes
to its authority.
B. Distinct Normative Realms
For a person living in a modern political regime, there are several
normative realms that can be distinguished from each other, at least
analytically:
• Personal moral ideas and ideals, such as “I should not steal or
lie;”
• Communal or customary standards, including those in family,
extended family, neighborhood, workplace, and other contexts
in which local norms are recognized and more or less
complied with. The special aspect of these norms is their
group reference. Thus, their form is “we” should not keep
others waiting, rather than the singular “I” should not keep
others waiting; and
• Law and legal institutions, such as “one should not exceed the
55 miles-per-hour speed limit by more than the local police
ordinarily permit.”
For convenience of reference, these standards or guides can be
respectively called “personal morals,” “ethics,” and “law.” In some
philosophical accounts a different nomenclature is employed, for example,
using the term “morals” to refer to community norms. However, this threefold general distinction is widely employed.
C. Personal Morals
“Personal morals” refers to guides or standards that are subjective to a
particular person. Of course, one person’s verbalization of a specific moral
standard can be shared with others, for example, in the generally
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proclaimed proposition that one should not lie or steal. But the operative
meaning of a moral standard in the mind of a particular person is something
that others can comprehend only by inference, sometimes no better than
guesswork. Some people who profess that one should not lie are consistent
in conforming to that moral virtue. However, many people who profess
that they do not lie, nevertheless, cannot be counted on to tell the truth. We
would say that the moral standard concerning the veracity of such people is
“I should not lie, except when doing so is absolutely convenient.” But we
cannot determine how such people would state the norm to themselves.
Some people are punctilious about not stealing, but have more
variegated approaches to telling the truth. Some are not scrupulous about
either lying or stealing or bad-mouthing others, but draw the line at
physical brutality. And there are bad actors whose primary standard of
conduct apparently is merely aversion to the risk of getting caught.
The more important point, however, is that each person acts through a
set of moral standards unique to that person. This set of moral standards
has relationship to religious belief or spirituality, a matter to which I will
presently return.
D. Community Norms: “Ethics”
“Ethics” is an appropriate term to refer to the standards of conduct
recognized within a social group, but not formalized into legal standards.
The term “ethics” derives from the Greek word “ethos,” which refers to the
character of a group. Thus, the Athenian Greeks considered that their ethos
was distinct and superior to that of the Greeks of Sparta. In modern
society, there are as many ethics as there are distinguishable groups: ethics
of the family (such as “be respectful of grandfather”), of the school (“don’t
mess with Dean Gordon”), of the workplace (“the boss is not always right,
but she is always the boss”), of a region, of people having a common
religious affiliation, etc.
Ethical variations within the larger community are particularly evident
in our diverse society. People whose vocations involve dealing with the
general public are especially aware of these ethical variations. It is familiar
that advertising, for example, is carefully designed to avoid offending
specific groups, or, on the other hand, to appeal to specific groups.
Election campaigns by candidates for public office are similarly tailored.
Members of professions such as medicine and law have ethical standards
internal to their callings and somewhat different norms of conduct in
dealing with customers (patients and clients). Lawyers take the variations
into account in selecting and addressing juries, and indeed in their
interchanges with judges.
E. Legal Norms
Law and legal institutions have gradually become a major source of
normative guidance in the modern world. In ancient times, law in the form
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of the king’s writ ran only infrequently into the farms and villages of the
agricultural communities that then predominated. Today, as we well know,
legal regulations penetrate deeply into workplaces, local institutions such
as schools, and even into relationships within a family. The “legal
invasion” is not only substantive, but also stylistic. In our country, legal
regulations and legal procedures have become the model for exposition and
discussion of all kinds of issues of right and wrong; witness, for example,
the dominance in television of law enforcement dramaturgy.
Of course, classifying the normative realms into only these categories
is a radical abstraction from reality. In fact, every single individual has a
complicated moral credo in his or her head and heart. A particular credo is
an amalgam of norms absorbed in childhood, through the educational
system, experience at jobsites and, for lawyers, even law school. The
variations among group norms are so complex as to be subjects of study in
the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology. Law and legal
institutions are now complex to the point that only trained lawyers can
understand them and indeed many branches of law are understood only by
specialists in particular subfields of law.
However, a simplified
categorization is an essential step in understanding the role of religion,
which is the direction of this presentation.
F. The Coexistence of Multiple Normative Realms
The various normative realms in which all of us must live are not
functionally separable. On the contrary, they coexist in complex
interaction, like the components of our physical world. The guidelines in
each normative realm generally correspond and reinforce each other. Thus,
in a sale or contract transaction there is an alignment of the moral guide
against lying, the common ethical norm about being truthful in business
matters, and the legal prohibition against fraud. So also, the moral, ethical,
and legal rules about avoiding physical harm to others generally point
toward the same pathway. A child who goes forth to school does not lose
his personal moral code or escape the teachings absorbed from his family.
Instead, he comes to recognize that there are other normative realms having
guidelines that must be taken into account. A few of us go on to law school
and into the practice of law and thereby learn still other systems.
In this process of maturation, however, we discover that the guidelines
in different realms often are in conflict, sometimes very sharp conflict. A
familiar conflict is between an obligation in one realm to tell the truth and
an obligation in another realm to be loyal to a fellow-member of a group.
This form of conflict arises within a family (“who did it” versus “don’t tell
on your brother”), at school, in the neighborhood, and in the workplace.
Similar conflicts between legal rules and group norms are familiar in
everyday law practice.
Indeed, one can say that serious ethical dilemmas typically involve,
not questions of distinguishing right from wrong, but deciding upon the
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priority between obligations emanating from different normative realms
that dictate inconsistent courses of action. Lawyers deal all the time with
actual or apparent inconsistencies in legal rules. People in ordinary life
also confront similar inconsistencies. A continuing responsibility in real
life is resolving, accommodating, or somehow adjusting to these
inconsistencies.
G. Legalistic Reasoning
In contemporary American life it has become fashionable to resolve or
accommodate among inconsistent obligations by resorting to reasoning that
is “legalistic” in the pejorative sense. The same technique can be called
casuistic in a similarly pejorative sense, as distinct from reasoning with
close attention to specific circumstances, which is the classic meaning of
casuistry. However, in my view there is such a thing as responsible and
coherent legal or casuistic reasoning.
Reasoning with regard to
circumstances does not have to be a search for loopholes or an exercise in
linguistic manipulation.
Nevertheless, legal reasoning by definition involves reasoning in
terms of legal rules. Legal rules have a unique combination of
characteristics. For one thing, legal rules are formally stated in words,
whereas morals and ethics ordinarily are not formally explicated. Second,
legal rules are governed by a constitutional premise peculiar to law, namely
that formality of expression must generally prevail over a meaning that
might have been understood, but which was not said. In any event,
reasoning about legal rules must take account of literal meaning, whereas
that is not required in comprehension of ethical norms. In my judgment the
law must adhere to its constitutional premise, for otherwise we would be
subject, not to the rule of law, but to the rule of persons—judges or
magistrates or agency officials.
Normative realms other than the law operate on a different premise,
namely that what counts is what was meant, not merely what was said. In
modern moral philosophy, perhaps the most famous illustration of the
primacy of meaning over language is Wittgenstein’s parable about teaching
children a game. In this parable, one adult asks another to “teach the
children a game,” in response to which the instructor addresses the game of
shooting craps, whereupon the initiating adult says: “That is not the kind of
game I meant.”
I suggest that in contemporary American society we have become
overly obsessed with what is said compared with what is meant. But
recognition of this deplorable development obliges us to consider the
normative source implied by the reference to “what is meant.” More
precisely, in asking for an understanding of “what is meant,” we need to
inquire into the kind of knowledge involved in such an understanding. It is
only with such understanding that we can appreciate our obligations and
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hence, what actions we should undertake and what actions we should
avoid.
H. Complexity in Understanding Obligations
Appreciating our obligations and how we ought to act is the ultimate
personal problem in life. In most forms of Christianity, it is held that there
is an afterlife and there are consequences in that stage for what has been
done in present life. Belief in an afterlife carries with it an expectation of
such consequences. But resolving how to act in life is significant in our
present existence, quite apart from afterlife.
Present existence in the modern world proceeds in normative
complexity, indeed perhaps chaos. Today we are situated as in years past
in the normative realms of family, parish, neighborhood, and workplace,
with occasional visits from the tax collector and government inspectors.
But today we are also confronted by, and give some allegiance to, norms
emanating from other groups, such as nationalism, ethnic identity, multiple
political affiliations (city, state, etc.), multiple vocational affiliations (legal
profession, firm, or agency, etc.), and groups defined in terms of “life
style.” Indeed, the currently fashionable term “diversity” has a negative
connotation as well as a positive one. “Diversity” reminds us of the many
communities that we inhabit simultaneously in the modern condition and
the conflicts and contradictions in the norms that emanate from the
different communities.
So how do we act or inhibit ourselves from acting in various
circumstances? I suggest that, in serious consideration of proper courses of
action in difficult situations, particularly those involving conflict among the
guidelines emanating from different normative realms, determining how to
act is a religious or spiritual experience. In the classic biblical phrase, it
“passeth all understanding.”2
This conclusion is supported by both negative and positive
considerations. The negative considerations are perhaps more familiar.
Most legal analysts would now agree with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
that “general propositions do not decide concrete cases.”3 I suggest that
limitation applies not only to general propositions of law, but also to
general propositions in other normative realms as well. For example, it is
pretty well recognized that telling a lie is not always sinful: consider the
case of the family member’s response to inquiry from the secret police as to
the whereabouts of a son or daughter. The same is true of an individual’s
personal moral realm. All of us are familiar with the dilemma of trying to
act in the face of personal norms that we fully accept, but which are
contradictory as applied to a specific case.

2.
3.

Phillipians 4:7 (King James).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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It should not be concluded that general verbal formulations are useless
or meaningless. Legal rules, ethical guidelines, and conclusions from
moral discourse are an essential element in worthwhile human existence.
Of equal importance can be instruction and discourse within a religious
community, for example, the Ten Commandments, the parables of Jesus,
and the insights in religious commentaries. Parables and generalizations
are at least starting places. That is, we recognize that we should not lie or
steal or fail to lend assistance to the needy—except perhaps under certain
circumstances. Unless there are relevant “certain circumstances,” we
should follow the general rule. Perhaps more important, generalization and
repetition of normative guidelines remind us that there are differences
between good and evil and between right and wrong, even if we cannot
consistently distinguish between them.
Yet most reasoning in law, moral philosophy, and other modes of
formal normative discourse comes to a halt more or less at this place. On
one hand, there is reiteration of the accepted generalizations against lying,
stealing, assault, etc. On the other hand, there is recognition that a
generalization should not apply in various circumstances. The typical
conclusion is that “it all depends.” And so on to the next exercise in legal
reasoning or moral philosophy.
I have to say that many of these exercises seem to me to be little more
than verbal maneuvers, conducted in such terms as “intention,” “possible
worlds,” “unconditional evaluative judgment,” “Humean,” and “Kantean.”4
The beginning place of philosophical analysis often is Aristotle’s
mysterious term “akrasia,”5 referring to the discrepancy often observed
between a supposedly rational calculation of course of action and a failure
of will (or, as Aristotle called it, “moral weakness”) in carrying through
with action.6 One modern ending place has been Bernard Williams’s
conclusion that we cannot get there through philosophical analysis, as
suggested by his title Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.7
I.

Religious Understanding

Perhaps the inquiry should proceed in different terms. Perhaps, in
other words, it is not “other words” that are to be sought. Instead, what is
needed is a different appreciation of how the human mind actually resolves
difficult problems of how to act—that what is involved is a religious or
4. An interesting recent anthology of philosophic essays is WEAKNESS OF WILL AND
PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY (Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet eds., 2003) (I am grateful to
Professor Charles Raff for this reference and for discussion of the problem.).
5. 7 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 226 (J.A.K. Thompson & Hugh Tredennick trans., Penguin
Books 1976).
6. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book Seven, at 174 (Martin Ostwald, trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962).
7. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) (see
particularly chapter seven).
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spiritual process. In this connection, I think it was very well said by
William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience:
When we drop abstractions and take what we call our will in the
act, we see that it is a very complex function. It involves both
stimulations and inhibitions; it follows generalized habits; it is
escorted by reflective criticisms; and it leaves a good or a bad
taste of itself behind, according to the manner of the
performance.8
A modern analyst, Ronald de Sousa, more sharply refers to a mental
state that is “an anarchic, disparate, and potentially conflicted amalgam of
dispositions.”9 Professor Charles Curran more positively refers to
“prudence”:
Prudence in the Thomistic tradition is the virtue associated with
practical reason. . . . Prudence for Aquinas is associated with art,
not science. . . . The artist does not work by deduction [but by]
imagination, the ability to discern what is appropriate, the feeling
for the most expressive, and a sense of harmony among all the
parts. . .10
And yet, when faced with difficult problems of action, most people in
fact take action. Taking action of course includes the action of remaining
in place, often called “inaction.” Only a few descend into catatonic
paralysis.
When a person can exercise the “will in the act,” to use James’ term,
in the face of a serious normative dilemma, they act with at least the
confidence required for action itself. Somehow we can do it, or at least
most of us can do it most of the time. Otherwise, we go into denial or
paralysis or insanity.
But is it possible to have a better understanding of exactly what is
involved in what Professor James called the religious experience? I
suggest that it is not possible to fully understand, which is the basic point.
But it is possible to unravel the complexity at least up to a point.
J.

Inconsistency and Incommensurability

One level of understanding is to accept that the normative guidelines
originating in various realms are inconsistent. Put bluntly, it is the case that
we often must choose a course of action, including the choice of inaction,
that is consistent with one norm that we accept and believe in, but which, at
the same time, is inconsistent with another norm that we also accept and
8. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 298 (1902).
9. Ronald de Sousa, Paradoxical Emotion: On Sui Generis Emotional Irrationality,
in WEAKNESS OF WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY, supra note 4, at 297. See also
RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987).
10. CHARLES CURRAN, THE CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION TODAY 180 (1999).
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believe in. There is no way that a rational mind can reconcile the
proposition “do A” (for example, tell the truth) with the proposition “do not
do A” (for example, betray a friend or family member). Endless confusion
originates with refusal to accept this simple fact.
A second level of understanding is to accept that the normative
guidelines to which we are subject emanate from different sources and that
the different sources have different authoritative standing. For example, if
I am outraged at bad treatment administered at school to my child, my
parental norm counsels seeking revenge, whereas my civic norm counsels
simply protesting through the appropriate channels. In this situation, the
law clearly prescribes that I should protest through the appropriate channels
and prescribes also that the legal procedure is more authoritative. But even
the law appreciates that there is civil disobedience, entailing denial of the
law’s own authority. One interpretation of the collision between Jesus and
Pontius Pilate is that it involved a dispute as to which normative realm
should have primary authority—the realm of God as Jesus understood it or
the realm of Rome as Pilate understood it.
That is, a moral dilemma often involves not merely conflicting rules
or admonitions, but conflicting normative systems from which specific
rules or admonitions have emanated. Issues of disloyalty, even treason or
apostasy, thus can be implicated.
A third level of understanding is that the conflicting norms and
inconsistent systems we confront often are predicated on very different
previous assumptions and commitments. The example of Jesus is perhaps
most vivid, certainly so for Christians. In a fundamental sense, the law of
Rome was irrelevant for Jesus because he was proceeding with a life and
mission outside the framework of Roman law. On the other hand, the
essence of Pilate’s responsibility was bureaucratic enforcement of Roman
law. The norms at issue were incommensurable or, as we would say in
modern slang, “not on the same page.”
There is yet another level of complexity in religious experience,
however. This can be called the unintelligibility of critical normative
choice. Stated simply, a person simply does not know and cannot know
how he or she makes or has made a normatively important choice. For
example, can any of us be absolutely sure whether we would lie to protect a
child or a spouse, or steal food for our family, or give evidence that might
convict a friend? Can we be sure, after the event, about the basis on which
we acted? Soldiers who have been decorated for bravery on the battlefield
typically say that they cannot recall how they chose what to do. Even those
who were not heroic typically can recall only that they froze. In a very
different domain, Yogi Berra put it well when he said that “you can’t think
and hit at the same time.”
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that we can think and hit at
the same time, but only that we cannot think what we are thinking as we
hit. We can pretend to do so, like the athletes in post-game interviews, but
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everyone knows those accounts are simply for the media. Instead, as a
thoughtful Catholic philosopher has suggested, we should pursue “the
recovery of mystery,” perhaps understanding that we can know it but not
understand it.11
K. Poetic Realism
The essential nature of this phenomenon is suggested in poetry.
Poetry can be said to be the use of language in non-analytic ways to convey
meanings and truths that cannot be conveyed in analytic terms. It is quite
the opposite of legal or philosophic discourse, which aim at meaning and
truth through precise language. But if meaning and truth are beyond
precise comprehension, then legal and philosophic discourse have
insurmountable limits. Poetry, and perhaps also music and art, are as close
as we can get to capturing what is involved in a difficult normative choice.
I believe this idea is expressed in a poem by Pope John Paul II. It may
not be generally recognized that the Pope has written poetry all his life,
beginning before he was twenty years of age and continuing through his
adult life. These are now published in English translation in the volume,
The Place Within.12 Several of his poems convey the meaning I am trying
to suggest. One of them seems to say it all. It is entitled Thought’s
Resistance to Words. The title itself makes the point. The poem goes as
follows:
Sometimes it happens in conversation: we stand
facing truth and lack the words,
have no gesture, no sign;
and yet—we feel—no word, no gesture
or sign would convey the whole image
that we must enter alone and face, like Jacob.
This isn’t mere wrestling with images
carried in our thoughts;
we fight with the likeness of all things
that inwardly constitute man,
But when we act can our deeds surrender
the ultimate truths we presume to ponder?13
CONCLUSION
The fact that “no word, no gesture or sign” can convey what we face
in serious moral dilemmas surely is disturbing. It means that morally
important decisions are unfathomable and hence beyond complete
11. See JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC TRADITION 337 (1987). See also id. at 78, 254-58.
12. POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE PLACE WITHIN (Jerzy Peterkiewicz trans., 1979).
13. Id. at 53.
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explanation. For those of us whose vocations involve the precise use of
words, it is difficult to accept that there are matters we cannot adequately
address. Philosophers, jurists, journalists, and politicians all have vocations
in that category. Perhaps artists, artisans, and engineers know better. But
if they do, of course they cannot say, because what needs to be said about
difficult normative choices really cannot be said. We are driven back to
faith, perhaps in ourselves, but perhaps also in religious teaching and
tradition.

